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1. INTRODUCTION
The term “constitution” has different connotations in domains of  political theory and public law studies. As the term is employed in expressions such as “mixed 
constitutions” and “constitutional division of  power” the area 
of  inquiry edges toward an analysis of  the layout of  political 
power of  the state rather than legal studies of  a normative 
locus of  basic principles of  sovereignty, individual rights, 
liberties, and other relevant concepts. On these grounds, 
several distinctions have been made between various types 
of  the constitution including parliamentary, presidential, 
and flexible and inflexible constitutions (Parpworth, 2012. 
p. 6–7). In spite of  these traditional patterns of  state 
structure, it is evident that a significant proportion of  the 
same socio-political principles and forms are reflected in a 
specific written formal document. These manuals then serve 
as the cornerstones of  the diversified modern-day political 
systems and are the locus where not only the doctrines 
of  sovereignty and rights are defined but also where the 
actual form of  the various parts of  government and their 
relations to the people are laid out (Ibid, 3). Hence, a closer 
study of  each country’s constitution could provide a better 
understanding of  the state’s doctrinal convictions on the 
modality of  the arrangement of  power and the safeguards to 
guarantee the survival and continuity of  certain repositories 
of  authority and legitimacy. The importance and centrality 
of  such legal provisions have been one of  the main themes 
of  political narratives since ancient times and have given 
rise to fundamentally or partially opposing schools of  
political philosophy. As regards the sources of  legitimacy 
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and sovereignty, the rational humanist school was said to 
accord the ultimate source of  power and authority to the 
people. On the other hand, certain politicized schools of  
theology promote notions of  divine sovereignty. Hence, it 
is not surprising that in modern-day societies the extent and 
the legitimacy of  political power have been at the heart of  
both secular and divine narratives of  sovereignty. Regardless 
of  this, the very existence of  an inclusive constitution in any 
society could be regarded as an important step toward the 
rationalization of  authority through such provisions as the 
separation of  power, equality before the law and in general 
the protection of  the citizen’s rights and liberties.
Thus, it is evident that, for a government to be capable of  
advancing any claims to secular legitimacy there should be an 
entrenched normative system of  rights. Hence, the building 
block of  every country’s political arrangement is its universal 
embodiment of  such an outline of  the structure of  power 
and rights, as reflected in its national constitution. This is 
usually where the basic guidelines are drawn to lay down 
the foundations of  various organizations and structures to 
preserve and promote certain values and convictions deemed 
to be central to the worldview underlying a certain political 
ideology.
Evidently, in some cases, this might well be an unwritten 
document based on established traditions and customs, 
as is the case with countries such as the United Kingdom 
(Parpworth, 2012. p. 11). Otherwise, in the majority of  
cases, it is a well-defined body of  guidelines, which ought 
to be resilient enough over time to serve as the basis for all 
subsequent developments of  the society. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to find a great variety of  constitutional formats 
with different degrees of  flexibility. For example, the North 
Korean constitution appears to be easier to amend and 
modify than many others, but is nonetheless proclaimed to be 
the bedrock of  its relative political system1. In any case there 
are universal functions which one could observe in a great 
majority of  the world’s constitutions today, such as being 
general by not entering into details, or being enforceable, 
clear, free of  internal contradictions and - most importantly 
- being superior and acting as the meta-law for all other legal 
provisions and directives in the country (Madani, 1997. p. 39). 
To safeguard these basic purposes of  a national constitution, 
various provisions and institutions need to be tirelessly at 
work to interpret any potential obscurities and make sure 
the entire political system is compliant with such provisions 
1 See the Constitution of  North Korea, in particular the 
‘Supreme People’s Assembly’ Chapter VI, especially Article 91.
and, if  need be, provide for the possibility of  amending the 
constitution in certain exceptional situations that might arise 
out of  unforeseen circumstances.
For the sake of  simplicity, one could claim that the main 
role of  any constitution is, on the one hand, to define the 
structure of  power in a society and on the other to protect 
and promote individuals’ rights which will constitute the 
subject of  the current study.
1.1. Background
Throughout Iran’s history there have been various royal 
acts and directives aimed at designing a socio-political order 
deemed essential to the correct functioning of  various 
social structures, but it was not until the early years of  
the 20th century that the country adopted what one could 
unequivocally define as a modern constitution (Deraxše, 
2012. p. 71-75). However, closer scrutiny of  various 
discourses, correspondences and public articles by different 
proponents of  the first Iranian constitution reveals that 
each contributing source had a fundamentally different 
understanding of  the epistemological nature of  the concept 
of  constitutionalism. Nevertheless, these trends resulted in 
the drafting of  the first Iranian constitution in 1906. The 
final result was a five-chapter constitution with 51 articles, 
together with a detailed preamble in 107 sections which was 
signed by the King in December 1906.
A closer examination of  the first Iranian constitution, 
which was predominantly based on Western legal sources, 
particularly the French and Belgian constitutions, on the 
one hand, and on certain Islamic Shari'a principles on the 
other (Rahimi, 1978. p. 94), shows that this by itself  was a 
ground-breaking achievement. The ambitious objective was 
to engender a system based on the rule of  law and a relatively 
restrained system of  political sovereignty in which the 
monarchy was forced to make significant concessions with 
respect to the basic rights of  the citizens. Indeed, it is argued 
that through this arrangement for the 1st time in Iran’s entire 
history the people of  the country acquired the actual legal 
status of  citizens and significant restrictions were imposed on 
the scope and extent of  the king’s hitherto unlimited power 
(Deraxše, 2012. p. 71-75).
In spite of  this substantial achievement, one could readily 
notice various shortcomings in this elementary document 
of  the early 20th century. First and foremost, one would 
struggle to find a coherent order in the drawing of  various 
sections of  the constitution and a large part of  the content 
seems to have been dedicated to instructions on the actual 
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running of  the parliament. Most importantly, various 
articles seem to be in clear contradiction to each other; 
for example, Article 26 on national sovereignty seems to 
be at odds with Articles 35–55 in which the rights of  the 
monarchy are laid out due to the incompatibilities in the 
extent and the scope of  their authorities. It is also not 
possible to identify any clear guidelines regarding basic 
constitutional notions such as the separation of  powers 
and independence of  these sources of  authority. In Article 
27, for example, both legislative and executive powers are 
subjected to the king, whereas Article 28 emphasizes the 
need for a clear separation of  powers. Furthermore, there 
seems to be some confusion regarding the roles and scope 
of  the authority of  both the national Parliament and the 
Senate. For instance, Articles 15–21 state that the legislation 
in “all matters” falls under the jurisdiction of  the national 
parliament whereas Articles 23–25 entrust certain legislative 
powers, such as the right to make national concessions and 
agreements or foreign borrowings and even the establishing 
of  companies, exclusively to the Senate.
In any case the Iranian constitutional monarchy witnessed 
numerous changes and amendments to the text of  the 
constitution particularly during the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
era (1941–1979), which were mainly aimed at including 
more secular notions, such as the new provisions on the 
choice and place of  work of  the court judges in Articles 81 
and 82, and conversely to pave the way for the succession 
within the Pahlavi dynasty (Esfad and Mohseni, 2000. p. 9). 
In addition, this period witnessed the institution of  modern 
government structures based on the European patterns and 
in particular fundamental transformation of  the judicial 
system, traditionally under the strict control of  the clergy 
and tribal leaders, into secular national judiciary institutions 
(Amin, 2003. p. 31).
Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, a new constitution 
was drafted to embody the doctrinal convictions of  the new 
religious elites. The initial text was prepared over 5 months 
and put to a popular vote; although this timescale does 
not reflect the considerable amount of  time Ayatollah 
Khomeini had previously dedicated to the formulation of  
his personal theory of  the nature of  an Islamic state. In fact, 
various elements of  the Iranian constitution could easily 
be traced back to Khomeini’s original treatise on Islamic 
Government. A brief  reflection on both texts reveals that 
Khomeini had been very consistent, although often elusive, 
in his fundamental convictions on Islamic government. In 
spite of  being a rudimentary article, “Islamic Government” 
- originally a collection of  19 lectures, was an attempt to 
elucidate his exclusive concepts of  the government entirely 
legitimized through a spiritual and religious qualification 
reserved for prophets, Imams and by extension the clergy 
(Ibid, 42). Therefore, the limited circle of  the clerical class 
was regarded as the only true guardian of  the “Islamic 
order” who could prevent any “innovation” in Shari’a law, 
“keep the people on the righteous path of  Islam,” “fight 
against the oppressors and protect the oppressed throughout 
the world,” “establish social justice” and “eliminate the 
western encroachment and influence on Islamic land” (Ibid, 
54). Moreover, the unquestionable capacity of  Shari’a to 
address all human societies’ modern-day needs is eloquently 
proclaimed by Khomeini as follows:
A complete guideline for government and administration, 
together with necessary laws, lies ready before you. If  the 
administration of  the country calls for taxes, Islam has made 
the necessary provision; and if  laws are needed, Islam has 
established them all.… Everything is ready and waiting … 
The Islamic Laws were laid down for the purpose of  creating 
a state and administering the political, economic and cultural 
affairs of  society (Ibid, 43).
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Iranian constitution 
closely reflects Khomeini’s ideas on the necessity of  
establishing a government firmly rooted in the Islamic Shari'a, 
which would, in turn, be placed under the direct control and 
supervision of  the Valiye Faqih (Guardianship of  the Islamic 
Jurist). This stemmed from the conviction that all non-Islamic 
systems of  government were instances of  kofr (disbelief) and 
taqut (tyranny), and it is ‘our duty to remove … from the 
lives of  Muslim society (all traces of  kofr) and destroy them’ 
(Ibid, 48). In short, as Hamid Algar expounds, the main 
themes of  Khomeini’s essay on “Islamic Government” is 
to subordinate political power to Islamic goals and precepts, 
and to define the duty of  the religious scholars to establish 
such a government and to assume the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers within it (Ibid, 25). Khomeini appears 
to go even further than that by actually denying the very 
necessity for a legislative power by underlining that “in Islam 
the legislative power and the competence to establish laws 
exclusively belongs to God almighty” (Ibid, 55). Thus, he 
concludes that in an Islamic government “a simple planning 
body should take the place of  the legislative assembly … who 
draws up programs for different ministers in the light of  the 
ordinances of  Islam” (Ibid, 56).
As will be demonstrated below, most of  these radical 
views were incorporated into the Islamic Republic of  
Iran’s constitution with profound implications not only 
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on a political level but also at all levels of  the cultural and 
social life of  the nation and beyond. Surprisingly, a few 
recent authors have questioned the existence of  an actual 
prior political agenda by Khomeini and underlined the fact 
that the initial drafts of  the constitution did not include 
any notions of  the Guardianship of  the Jurist central to 
Khomeini’s initial treatises (Rahnema, in Adib-Moghaddam, 
2014, Chapter 4). It is not within the scope of  this study 
to analyze the truthfulness and coherence of  the social, 
psychological, and personal underpinnings of  Khomeini’s 
dexterous maneuvering of  public sentiments in the months 
building up to the public vote on the constitution. Although 
motivations matter, the political actions and the actual on-
the-ground manifestations of  personal convictions of  the 
policy-makers are more interesting subjects for political 
scientists. This indeed constitutes the central distinctive 
feature of  the field of  political science as compared to 
other domains of  the human sciences such as sociology, 
philosophy, or psychology. Hence, despite numerous 
constitutional notions introduced both because of  the 
influence of  the secular elements within the revolutionary 
forces and also as an inevitable result of  moderate 
ideological elements within the Shi'a school of  political 
theology (Axworthy, 2013. p. 161–162), the ideology that 
eventually prevailed throughout the constitution proved 
to be the original narrow and exclusive Najaf  arguments 
of  Khomeini regarding the mandate of  the jurists and the 
constitutional role and rights of  the people in the Islamic 
Republic, which might indeed have been an unintended 
result of  pure chance, ideological reorientation or a 
combination of  various concomitant forces.
The electoral law was thus drafted by a restricted group 
of  predominantly religious scholars that was to be called 
the “Assembly of  Experts” during June and July of  1979. 
Elections were also held at the same time to choose 73 
members of  parliament to represent different regions and 
religious minorities of  the country (Madani, 1991. p. 39). 
This eventually led to the formulation of  the Iranian 
constitution in 12 chapters and 175 articles which were 
put to a public vote in December 1979. With the notable 
exception of  the Democratic Party of  Iranian Kurdistan and 
a few other smaller groups who boycotted the referendum 
as a sham, the constitution was unsurprisingly approved by 
an overwhelming majority of  Iranians. It has since been 
amended once, in April 1989, following a formal request by 
Ayatollah Khomeini detailing the sections to be revised by a 
reviewing committee who were to carry out the amendments 
(Hašemi, 1994. p. 31).
2. THE CONSTITUTION
One could safely claim that the main function of  any national 
constitution is to resource, protect and promote the basic 
rights and liberties of  its citizens. The endorsement of  such 
principles could be observed even in the first constitution of  
Iran adopted in 1906, in which Articles 8–25 were directly 
dedicated to this issue and covered a significant part of  the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights. As far as the current 
argument is concerned, it is interesting to note that certain 
articles such as Articles 18, 20, and 21 still set out the limits 
of  education, public communication, publication, assemblies, 
and public gatherings to not being harmful to the principles 
of  Islam or explicitly banned by the Shari’a2.
This initial constitution was subject to various modifications 
and revisions until the Islamic Revolution of  1979 embarked 
on the task of  drafting an entirely new document based directly 
on the proclaimed principles of  Islam as interpreted by the 
founders of  the Islamic Republic. Here again the citizen’s rights 
have been endorsed in various articles; in particular Articles 
19–42 are entirely dedicated to the individual’s liberties under 
the title “Rights of  the People.” Before this part the initial 
section on “General Principles” also addresses this subject, in 
particular, Article 2, section 6 stresses the “dignity and value of  
man and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God3.” 
Furthermore, in the same article in section C, it is declared: 
(the Islamic Republic is a system based on) “the negation of  
all forms of  oppression, both the infliction and submission to 
it, and of  dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance.”
3. PLACE OF MEDIA IN THE CONSTITUTION
The 3rd Article of  the Iranian constitution is very broad and 
addresses various issues which are developed throughout the 
following chapters of  the constitution. These highlighted 
principles of  individual liberties constitute a practical outline 
which could be used as a point of  departure to trace and analyze 
all relevant articles throughout the constitution and attempt to 
elucidate how these have been passed down in the form of  legal 
provisions and public laws within the Iranian legislative system.
Section 2 of  Article 3 declares that one of  the functions of  
the Islamic Republic is to “raise the level of  public awareness 
in all areas, through the proper use of  the press, mass media, 
2 See supplement I on the Iranian constitution of  1906.
3 The Iranian constitution with modification of  1989, Islamic 
Republic Official Gazette.
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and other means.” This section is fully developed in Article 24 
of  the constitution which reads: “Publications and the press 
have freedom of  expression except when it is detrimental 
to the fundamental principles of  Islam or the rights of  the 
public. The details of  this exception will be specified by law.”
A brief  survey of  the relevant legal provisions reveals 
interesting aspects of  these normative formulations within the 
Islamic republican system. The Press Law dated March 1986 
with the additional April 2000 supplement clearly sets out the 
guidelines regulating the press’ activity in Iran. The mission 
of  the authorized press as stated here includes such official 
tasks as: “To increase the public awareness, fight against the 
imperialist cultures of  waste, luxury and lust and emphasize 
the culture of  no to west and no to east4.” Prescriptive 
instructions foresee that “all newspapers need to participate in 
the realization of  at least one of  the above objectives and not 
be in contradiction with others5.” In particular, the supplement 
of  April 2000 more clearly delineates the boundaries of  the 
activities of  the press, with unambiguous emphasis on the 
fact that it should strictly avoid publishing material which is:
Detrimental to the principles of  Islam and against Islamic 
laws, and public morality … should refrain from incitement 
to take action against the interests of  the Islamic Republic 
… should strictly avoid leveling false accusations against the 
leader … the personalities, organizations and institutions of  
the Islamic Republic … or offending the religious authorities 
even though this might be in the form of  publishing their 
portraits or their caricatures6.
These and numerous other legal provisions set out detailed 
guidelines by the legislators of  Iran to safeguard the principal 
convictions of  the Islamic Republic. The foreseen punishment 
for such violations as “to insult Islam and its sacred principles” 
is actually the same capital punishment as that reserved for 
heresy and the negation of  religious fundamentals7.
4 This has been one of  the main slogans of  the Islamic Republic 
which, in an attempt to differentiate its ideology from the 
Western ideologies and the Eastern Bloc doctrines, adopted 
the slogan of  ‘no to East and no to West.
5 Islamic Republic Official Press, Press Law March 1986 with 
the added supplement of  April 2000.
6 Ibid.
7 Article 26 for the press law refers to such crimes as ertedad 
(heresy) deserving capital punishment. It goes on to add that 
in cases in which the crime of  heresy is not applicable other 
commensurate punishments based on the Islamic Penal Code 
will be administered.
Therefore, it is easy to recognize various pitfalls in the Iranian 
constitution and the related legislation regarding freedom of  
the press and public means of  communication. Undoubtedly, 
as shown above, interesting potentials for the safeguarding of  
the principle of  the freedom of  expression within the Iranian 
constitution could be identified. There are sections of  the 
constitution which clearly endorse such basic individual rights 
and seemingly put all members of  the public on an equal 
footing of  common standing8. Nonetheless, closer scrutiny 
reveals that these provisions are all subjected to various 
restrictions and supervising organs9 which are endowed with 
effective means to suppress or severely restrict ad arbitrium 
various modalities of  free expression of  thought within the 
Islamic Republic.
Furthermore, all relevant articles seem to have been very 
broadly drafted and vaguely worded to the point that they 
could easily be employed to waive even the most basic 
public rights in this domain. The concept of  insult or “false 
accusation” is so broad and the punishments so severe 
that undoubtedly this would lead to significant amounts of  
auto-censorship or the “anticipated sanctions” to avoid the 
potentially violent consequences of  publicly denouncing 
anything. If  the criticism or public denunciation of  a perceived 
shortcoming of  any “personalities, organizations, and public 
institutions” could constitute a potential for false claims, such 
“criticism” could be severely burdened with several heavy 
punishments laid out by these regulations, not least because 
free access to information and source verification is never 
guaranteed in the relevant legal frameworks. In addition, 
the restrictions on publishing any material deemed harmful 
to the “interests of  the Islamic Republic” would leave very 
little room for any act of  public expression at all, let alone 
the basic exercise of  democratic rights of  contestation and 
invigilation.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON EDUCATION
Returning to Article 3 of  the constitution, sections 3 and 
4 endorse the necessity for providing free education and 
physical training to all members of  the society. These sections 
are further developed in Article 30 with similar guidelines 
instructing the government to provide everyone with free 
8 Articles 19 and 20 for instance.
9 All newspapers and other mass communication material, along 
with all media and public entertainment creations, need to 
be verified and authorised by the Islamic Republic’s Islamic 
Culture and Guidance ministry.
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elementary and higher education to “the point of  national 
self-sufficiency.”
It must be recognized that the Islamic Republic has 
dedicated a significant amount of  resources to realizing the 
objectives of  these articles. Nevertheless, there is still a lot 
of  work to be done, in particular concerning the content 
of  the educational material which could not be treated 
in this space but as far as the constitutional provisions 
and their direct outcomes on the state’s normative 
policies and regulations are concerned, several aspects 
of  these fundamental guidelines should be highlighted. 
It appears that considerable effort has been made to give 
the educational system a specific direction, for example, 
by limiting the study of  natural sciences. This direction 
is particularly apparent when teachings are deemed 
contrary to the principles of  Islam. There has been direct 
manipulation of  teaching curricula at primary, secondary, 
and higher education level to censor material considered 
hostile to the principles upheld by the Islamic regime. It is 
said that, currently, there are 12 separate working groups 
within the Islamic Culture and Islamic Guidance ministry 
implementing a pervasive mechanism of  censorship 
on all published material in Iran10. This process was 
initiated immediately following the Islamic Revolution, 
particularly through the so-called “Cultural Revolution” 
of  1980–1983, during which time a complete revision and 
purging of  teaching material and academic staff  took place 
in an attempt to introduce new syllabi and educational 
curricula based on the newly constitutionalized precepts 
of  the Islamic Shari’a11. A recent example of  this would 
be the suppression of  teaching material on the scientific 
basis of  evolutionary biology or the teaching ban on 
Western philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas or even 
the former authorities of  the Islamic Republic such as the 
late presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjāni or Mohammad 
Khatami, whose books and articles are severely restricted 
from circulation12. These include books which have 
previously been authorized for publication but have later 
been blacklisted in light of  new political developments.
To better manage the flow of  information, and to filter and 
channel the sources of  public education and information, 
10 See for instance a report on this mechanism here.
11 See for instance Mojab (2004) “State University Power Struggle 
at Times of  Revolution and War in Iran” International Higher 
Education here.
12 A sample list of  some of  the forbidden books by the Islamic 
Republic can be found here.
the Islamic Republic has instated a dedicated ministry 
called the Ministry of  Culture and Islamic Guidance 
which effectively regulates any material destined for 
mass publication and the national educational system. 
Unsurprisingly, such meticulous control, selection, filtering, 
and eventual punishments have resulted in arbitrary 
invigilation, direct interference and even self-censorship 
by all actors in the socio-cultural sectors.
Thus, although the constitutional article and legal provisions 
relating to education have endorsed the necessity of  providing 
an inclusive system of  free national education, various forms 
of  manipulation, censorship, filtering, and the threat of  
possible punishment have ipso facto reduced the scope and 
usefulness of  this important constitutional repository of  
rights and liberties. Accordingly, the educational system 
appears to have degenerated into a strictly guided formative 
vehicle for providing a restricted kind of  information and 
learning closely reflecting the totalitarian patterns of  the 
prevailing cultural hegemony13.
5. PERSONAL LIBERTIES
Moving onto sections 6 and 7 of  Article 3 of  the Iranian 
constitution one encounters important provisions regarding 
the necessity of  “eliminating all forms of  despotism and 
tyranny and all attempts to monopolize power” and also of  
“guaranteeing the political and social freedom within the 
framework of  the law.”
These two sections, together with other relevant 
articles, constitute the main normative repository for 
the protection of  the citizen’s basic rights. An in-depth 
survey of  the constitution demonstrates that these 
concepts are further developed directly in 9 Articles 
throughout the constitution with numerous other articles 
indirectly related to these themes. The 1st Article directly 
treating these principles is Article 19 of  Chapter 3 under 
the title: “Rights of  the People.” This article upholds 
the conviction that “all people of  Iran, whatever their 
ethnic group or tribe, enjoy equal rights; and color and 
race and language do not bestow any privilege.” It is 
worth mentioning that Iran is also a signatory of  various 
international covenants and treaties upholding these 
principles, which effectively makes the country a proactive 
member of  international charters on non-discrimination 
13 Detailed analysis of  various mechanisms of  Cultural 
Hegemony can be found in Antonio Gramsci’s seminal work 
Prison Notebooks (1992)
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and the fight against racism and apartheid14. The same 
notion had also been underlined in Article 8 of  the first 
Iranian constitution of  1906. On a side note, it should be 
reiterated that there are far-reaching injunctions on this 
principle in Iranian history dating back to the 6th century 
bc in the form of  the cuneiform cylinder made by order 
of  the Persian King Cyrus15. Therein it is believed the 
king explicitly forbade slavery and servitude, a mandatory 
provision in an empire composed of  numerous ethnicities, 
cultures, and religions16.
Notwithstanding this, both before and after the Islamic 
Revolution, it is still possible to observe many shortcomings 
and in some cases discrimination and deprivation which 
could at least partially be interpreted on the grounds of  
ethnic and religious idiosyncrasies. Foreign observers and 
human rights organizations have repeatedly accused the 
Islamic Republic of  widespread discriminatory laws and 
practices on ethnic, religious, gender, or other distinctive 
grounds, to which the Iranian government has not appeared 
to be very responsive17.
The second constitutional article directly related to sections 
6 and 7 of  Article 3 is the very comprehensive Article 20 of  
the Iranian constitution. It reads: “All citizens of  the country, 
both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of  the law 
14 These include: The International Convention on the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination. This 
has been adopted, opened for signature and ratification 
by General Assembly resolution 2106, 21 December 1965 
and the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid, New York, 30 
November 1973
15 There is some disagreement concerning the interpretations 
of  the actual content of  the Cyrus Cylinder; nevertheless 
numerous sources and historic records, including religious 
texts such as the Old Testament, attest to a high level of  
social tolerance and openness by the Persian monarch 
towards the different ethnic groups, religions and cultures 
enabling one to seamlessly highlight the uniqueness of  
such policies throughout the ancient world. See for instance 
Masroori, C. (1999) ‘Cyrus II and the Political Utility of  
Religious Toleration’, in Laursen, J. C. (ed.), Religious 
toleration: the variety of  rites from Cyrus to Defoe, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press.
16 It is interesting to notice that the practice of  slavery was 
formally outlawed more than 2000 years later in the Western 
political tradition.
17 See the latest United Nations Human Rights reports on Iran 
here.
and enjoy all human, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights in conformity with the Islamic injunctions.” This is 
further detailed in:
• Article 21 on women’s rights;
• Article 23 on individuals’ beliefs;
• Article 25 on the prohibition of  inspection in private 
communications;
• Article 26 on the freedom of  political and professional 
associations;
• Article 27 on the right to hold public gatherings and 
marches;
• Article 32 on the prohibition of  illegal arrests and 
detainments; and other articles related to the freedom 
of  occupations, residence, and so on.
All these fundamental articles provide a significant number 
of  constitutional guarantees to uphold various principles of  
individual liberties. A closer analysis of  each of  these articles 
and their actual enactment within the relative normative 
frameworks is needed here to see how these constitutional 
guidelines have been reflected in the ordinary laws of  the 
Islamic Republic.
As regards the general provisions on the protection of  private 
space, Article 22 states that “the dignity, life, property, rights, 
residence, and occupation of  individuals are protected from 
violation, except in cases sanctioned by law.” Thereafter, 
Article 23 guarantees the right to hold personal beliefs by 
clearly stating that: “The investigation of  individuals’ beliefs 
is forbidden; no one may be molested or questioned for 
holding a certain belief.” These articles are clear reflections 
of  the relevant principles of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights18.
Unsurprisingly, the limits of  these freedoms are declared to 
be set by relevant legal provisions. A brief  consideration of  
a selection of  these provisions is instructive here. Property 
rights have been endorsed in many pieces of  legislation19 
which seem to be relatively compliant with the international 
laws and conventions. Other provisions such as Articles 
24 and 34 of  Iran’s Code of  Criminal Procedure, which 
states that “the police cannot detain suspects for more 
18 See Articles 3, 5, 6, 9 and 12 of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights and Articles 6, 9 and 12 of  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights accessible on the United 
Nations’ website here.
19 See for instance Articles 30, 132, 301, 311, 329 and 331 of  the 
Islamic Republic’s Civil Code.
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than 24 h and have to immediately refer the case to the 
appropriate juridical sources” also satisfies the minimum 
requirements for the protection of  individual’s rights 
in such specific circumstances20. Nevertheless, several 
instances of  incompatibility and in some cases outright 
contradictions in the existing legal framework should be 
underlined.
As explained above, the Article 23 guarantees the 
individual’s right to hold any belief  but makes no 
reference to the actual “expression” of  those beliefs. 
In fact, it is not possible to identify any articles that 
explicitly and unambiguously guaranteed the freedom 
of  expression for individuals. The provisions reserved 
for the means of  mass communication were discussed 
previously; it is interesting to observe that these could not 
be automatically extended to the expression of  personal 
beliefs and convictions at the individual level. Individual 
beliefs could include all intellectual convictions in the 
domains of  religion, culture, politics, and so on which in 
theory should be protected by this article. It goes without 
saying that the ideas should be expressed to come to 
be recognized as such in the public domain, but there 
are various means of  expression which go beyond oral 
and written acknowledgement of  convictions. Practical 
example of  such expressions of  belief  could include 
wearing a cross around your neck, for instance, or a 
symbol denoting atheism or any known organization 
or association - as long as this does not directly offend 
another member of  society.
Thus, it would appear that this major omission concerning 
the freedom of  expression in the text of  the constitutional 
article would cause a significant vacuum which could 
potentially give rise to various arbitrary suppressions of  
individual liberties in the absence of  any unambiguous 
normative guarantee in this matter. Various authors have 
tried, on the one hand, to interpret the article to cover actual 
expressions of  personal beliefs by logical extension and, on 
the other hand, to affirm that it only guarantees the holding 
of  personal beliefs and not the actual act of  expression, 
which demonstrates the great ambiguity and potential 
for misinterpretation that exists in this article21. A brief  
comparison with the relevant articles of  the International 
20 See for instance Articles 22 to 25 and 96 to104 of  the Iranian 
Code of  Criminal Procedure here.
21 For a detailed discussion of  this argument see Izanloo, 2003, 
and Katouzian, 1998.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights22 and the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights would elucidate this point. 
Article 19 of  the International Covenant reads in part:
Everyone has the right to freedom of  opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of  frontiers.
Only such an unambiguous declaration could stand a chance 
of  protecting the basic rights of  individuals, which would 
otherwise be trampled on and waived due to potentially ad 
arbitrium interpretations.
One final observation involves the protection of  religious 
beliefs in the Iranian constitution. Article 13 acknowledges 
that Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity are the only 
recognized minority religions. Therefore, there are no 
guarantees of  freedom for followers of  any other faiths 
to practise their religion or to include their religious, or 
non-religious for that matter, convictions in any official 
social contexts and forms. This is not only in contrast with 
the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (Article 2 in 
particular) but also in clear contradiction to the affirmation 
of  “all people of  Iran” in Article 19 of  the same constitution 
which declares “equal rights” for all.
6. WOMEN’S RIGHTS
This is a very problematic area for any legislation founded 
on the doctrinal convictions of  the so-called “Western 
religions,” including the Islamic Shari’a. Certain modernist 
states in the Islamic world such as Turkey and Tunisia have 
22 Article 19 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights:
 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference;
 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of  expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of  all kinds, regardless of  frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of  art, or 
through any other media of  his choice;
 3. The exercise of  the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of  
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It 
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
 (a) For respect of  the rights or reputations of  others;
 (b) For the protection of  national security or of  public order, 
or of  public health or morals.
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opted for a modern interpretation of  religious prescriptions 
in this matter to be able to endorse a certain level of  gender 
equality and parity of  the sexes. Conversely, the Iranian legal 
framework with its salient religious proclamations could not 
fully accommodate the provision of  its own constitution 
throughout its legislative arrangements23. A brief  survey of  
Iranian legislation in this regard reveals a significant body 
of  discriminatory laws aimed at extending male domination 
in various sociocultural and private domains. Article 1133 
of  the Civil Code, for instance, reserves the right to divorce 
for men only and provides further simplification in cases 
where the wife suffers from certain types of  illnesses; 
whereas the wife does not enjoy equivalent rights even 
in the case of  certain serious ailments of  the husband. 
Article 1130 of  the same Code defines the rare cases 
where the wife could actually file for divorce, including 
such instances as when she can prove to have been subject 
to “continuous and unbearable physical mistreatment.” 
Thus, it is unambiguously implied that when the physical 
mistreatment could be said to be “tolerable,” there will be no 
grounds for a wife-initiated request for the legal dissolution 
of  the marriage. Even in such specific case, the wife is 
usually required to waive all her legal and financial rights 
sanctioned by law or specified in the matrimonial deed. 
Another blatant example based on the Islamic Shari’a is that 
monetary compensation paid in the event of  unintentional 
manslaughter would be half  as much in the case of  women 
compared to men24. Numerous other examples could be 
cited which highlight a systematic and prevailing legal 
discrimination on gender grounds throughout the Islamic 
Republic normative injunctions.
On the other hand, it is also possible to identify certain 
examples of  the actual protection of  women’s rights, 
particularly regarding their rights to maintenance, protection 
from certain types of  physical violence, legislation against 
physical abuse and prostitution together with some 
provisions for work environment entitlements and various 
provisions for social and economic assistance25. Despite 
this, the majority of  these laws, in particular Article 21 of  
the Constitution - which in theory should serve as the basis 
23 This is indeed the case due to numerous religious guidelines, 
in particular explicit instructions in the Quran such as those in 
the Surah Al-Nisa requiring total obedience and subordination 
of  women to men in all life matters; see for instance Quran, 
Al-Nisa: 34
24 See for instance Article 382 of  the Islamic Penal Code of  Iran.
25 See for instance Articles 1085 of  the Civil Code and Article 
76 of  the Labour Law.
for the protection and promotion of  basic women’s rights 
- seem to have adopted a protectionist approach toward 
the safeguarding of  the already underprivileged position 
of  women, rather than actually empowering them to gain 
equal social rights. Indeed it appears that the emphasis 
seems to have shifted toward the protection of  the family 
and motherhood with significant consequences for women’s 
individual rights. Such assertions of  rights do not seem to 
stem from women’s entitlement to basic elements of  right 
as individuals independent from the role they ought to play 
in a religious, family-oriented society26.
All these discriminatory legal frameworks point to the 
conclusion that the Islamic Republic does not appear to 
have been successful in enacting various international 
charters or even some of  its own constitutional 
provisions27. Hence, it appears that very little has been 
done to empower women in the Islamic Republic, who 
seem to be shackled by centuries of  discriminating socio-
cultural traditions and beliefs. On the contrary, all evidence 
indicates that in practice they have actively been restricted 
and discriminated against in a system where the only 
“dignifying” role for women seems to be in the capacity 
of  motherhood. Several repercussions of  such a prevailing 
religious ideology can be identified, such as a significant 
number of  juvenile marriages of  underage women, which 
underscore a considerable amount of  actual domination 
in private spheres28. To mention yet another instance of  
such a prevailing domination, Article 1041 of  the civil code 
could be cited which acknowledges that while the legal 
marriage age for girls is set at 13 years, the marriage of  
girls below this age would still be permitted if  the father 
or the grandfather of  such an underage individual gets 
permission from a civil judge29.
It is interesting to note that one specific recurrent expression 
in the Iranian Civil Code on family laws, based on the Islamic 
religious exegeses, is the term tamkin (obedience), which 
provides significant grounds for the subjugation of  women 
in all private spheres. The term is regularly referred to in 
26 In sections 2 and 3 of  Article 21 dedicated to the protection 
of  women’s rights we read: ‘the government must ensure the 
protection of  mothers, particularly during pregnancy and 
childbearing and to … establish competent courts to protect 
and preserve family’.
27 See for instance the United Nations’ recent special report here.
28 See for instance the UN’s stand on this matter as reflected in 
an article here.
29 Article 1041 of  the Iranian Civil Code.
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civil laws and Islamic Penal Code when describing women’s 
conjugal duties. Hence, unsurprisingly, the ordinary laws 
of  the Islamic Republic derived from these dominatory 
constitutional and legal provisions prove to provide 
significant grounds for the encroachment of  individual 
liberties and independence.
7. POLITICAL PARTIES
Other arguments dealt within Article 3 of  the constitution, 
which has so far been utilized as a basic point of  departure 
for the analysis of  fundamental individual rights in the 
Iranian constitution, are the guarantees for the protection of  
individual rights to participate in or form political and social 
parties and associations. Articles 26 and 27 further develop 
these principles and delineate the framework of  these liberties 
in society. Article 26 in particular declares:
The formation of  parties, societies, political, or professional 
associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or 
pertaining to one of  the recognized religious minorities is 
permitted provided that they do not violate the principles of  
independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of  Islam, 
or the foundations of  the Islamic Republic.
Various aspects of  this article deserve further analysis. First 
of  all, it is noteworthy that in terms of  religious parties 
and associations, only the officially recognized religions 
are authorized to have their own associations, which as 
discussed previously, proves to be extremely discriminatory 
to the followers of  other convictions and faiths. Second, 
and most importantly, the clear “red line” set out here for 
the activities of  political parties is declared to be the fact 
that they should not violate the basic principles of  the 
Islamic Republic. This becomes clearer in Article 27, where 
the freedom of  peaceful public gathering and marches 
is guaranteed provided that they are not “detrimental to 
the principles of  Islam.” This is a recurrent limit set for 
most articles concerning the basic principles of  individual 
liberties and all their social and political means and modes 
of  public manifestations. As seen previously, this is a very 
broad principle that could be interpreted in various ways. 
Most strikingly the Council of  the Guardians of  the Islamic 
Republic - which is constitutionally the only authorized 
body for providing interpretation and clarification of  
the ambiguities in the constitution - refrained on at least 
one occasion from providing any clarification to this 
phrase following official enquiries from the government 
authorities30. Unsurprisingly, the ordinary laws of  the 
Islamic Republic dominated by conservative legislative 
elements have interpreted this to implement restrictive 
provisions both on the formation of  political parties and 
even on peaceful public gatherings and associations, to 
the point where, with the exception of  the so-called “loyal 
opposition,” currently, there is no single fully independent 
political party in the Islamic Republic31.
Regarding the ordinary laws derived from such constitutional 
injunctions, Article 6 of  the law on activities of  the political 
parties, ratified in August 1981, could be cited. This law 
sets out numerous exceptions to the freedom of  activity 
of  various political, social and professional parties and 
associations including: “Violating the principles of  national 
independence, contact with foreign embassies, receiving 
money from foreign countries, violating Islamic principles 
and the basic foundations of  the Islamic Republic (with) anti-
Islamic propaganda.” Furthermore, various articles of  Iran’s 
Islamic Penal Code are dedicated to punishments foreseen 
by law not only for those who perform activities against 
national security (ex. Articles 71, 109) but also those who 
are involved in propaganda against the system or promotion 
of  groups and organizations which are against the Islamic 
Republic (Article 286).
Once again, as with other articles of  the Islamic Republic’s 
constitution cited above, it is impossible to overlook 
interesting attempts to include various principles of  the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (Article 20) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 
21). Despite this, numerous restrictions and provisions and, 
most importantly, inherent ambiguities, have rendered these 
articles incapable of  resourcing and protecting the most basic 
principles of  civil liberty.
In addition, various levels of  inconsistency can be highlighted 
which seem to have been caused primarily by a profound 
underlying ambiguity in the interpretation of  the locus of  
legitimacy and sovereignty within the Iranian constitution. 
As shown above, there is an explicit acknowledgement of  
the role of  the people in administering all “affairs of  the 
30 Collections of  the Opinions of  the Council of  the Guardian. 
Research Centre of  the Council of  the Guardians pub. 2002, 
p.373, hence the expression “detrimental to the principles of  
Islam” remains be extremely vague and flexible with notorious 
consequences.
31 See for instance the research published on the only existing 
Iranian parties here.
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country” (Article 6). Nonetheless, numerous limitations 
and boundaries imposed on this exercise of  authority seem 
to directly contradict the explicitly highlighted rights and 
prerogatives of  the people. The existence of  these numerous 
ambiguities and in some cases even contradictions within the 
Iranian Fundamental Law, inevitably raise the question of  
what sources of  clarification have been foreseen within the 
constitution itself  to deal with the numerous potentials for 
misinterpretation. Yet another example of  such complications 
can be pointed out in Article 14 of  the constitution, which 
claims that: “The Government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Iran and all Muslims are bound to treat non-Muslims in 
conformity with ethical norms and the principles of  the 
Islamic justice and equity and to respect their human rights.” 
As discussed previously, only three religions are officially 
recognized by the Islamic Republic in Article 13 of  the 
constitution. Thus, it is unclear how the Islamic Republic 
could guarantee the “human rights” of  all non-Muslims while 
not recognizing the basic rights to religious organizations for 
the non officially recognized congregations of  faith. It goes 
without saying that the individual rights of  those with no 
religious convictions are not even mentioned therein.
Hence as highlighted above the only envisaged authoritative 
source for clarifying constitutional omissions, ambiguities and 
contradictions, remains to be the same Council of  Guardians 
whose members are half  appointed by the Leader of  the 
Islamic Republic and the other half  proposed by the head 
of  the judiciary system, himself  directly appointed by the 
Leader. Thus, the Office of  the Leader directly or indirectly 
hand-picks all members of  the Council of  Guardians which 
could raise serious concerns regarding the nonalignment 
and impartiality of  the council as the sole interpreter of  the 
Islamic Republic’s Constitution.
8. CONCLUSION
This study attempted to show that the constitution of  
the Islamic Republic fails to provide solid unambiguous 
foundations for promoting, protecting and sanctioning 
adequate guarantees for the protection of  elementary 
individual rights on several levels. It was empirically 
demonstrated by referring the constitutional injunctions 
to the actual sanctions of  the ordinary laws of  Iran, that a 
significant pitfall has been created for systematic violation 
of  rights which not only concerns minorities and women 
but also the entire Iranian population. In addition to all this, 
a fundamental void could be felt regarding the existence 
of  an overriding impartial constitutional court capable of  
enforcing the very same principles of  the Iranian constitution. 
As it was shown, the Council of  the Guardians, which is 
constitutionally defined as the authority for interpreting 
ambiguities and addressing potential claims, proves to be a 
mere legal tool in the hands of  the same dominant religious 
ideology for doctrinal imposition of  values which at times 
has even acted as a powerful contravening body against the 
prerogatives of  the legislative system. Unsurprisingly, due 
to such fundamental constitutional flaws the contemporary 
history of  Iran abounds with instances where questionable 
verdicts have been delivered, political leaders, activists 
and members of  public have been silenced, or other 
contraventions against the basic principles of  human rights 
have taken place.
This indeed raises the question of  the centrality or even the 
relevance of  a corpus of  Fundamental Law in a country 
where the centers of  loyalty and allegiance prove to be above 
and beyond formally agreed on loci of  rights and authority.
All evidence examined, it will be uncontroversial to 
claim that as things stand, not only do we fail to identify 
significant constitutional guarantees for upholding individual 
rights in several domains but also that the same body of  
laws and normativity appear to be the prime suspect for 
institutionalizing the systematic violation of  the basic 
principles of  human rights. In recent years reformist 
presidents such as Khatami and Rouhani have repeatedly 
called for a full implementation of  the Iranian constitution 
as a means to promote basic individual liberties. Yet as it 
was demonstrated here the actual source of  domination in 
the Iranian political layout appears to be the very normative 
repositories that are theoretically destined for diametrically 
opposing ends. Hence, all the data examined points to 
the conclusion that the buoni leggi (good laws) as the first 
cornerstone of  any political edifice claiming to be upholding 
principles of  right and liberty, appear to be fundamentally 
lacking in the system under analysis32. In such a layout of  
public law, any assertions of  principles of  individual rights 
appear to have been fundamentally waived by means of  
the alleged claims of  raison de foi which, as shown, has 
systematically permeated the entire normative apparatus of  
the Islamic Republic.
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